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Abstract 
Using a macroeconometric model we provide a quantitative estimate of the cash transfer or tax 
cut that would achieve recovery from a severe recession when the central bank is unable to achieve full 
recovery because of the zero bound.  We introduce an automatic transfer and simulate its triggering in the 
severe recession.  We find that an automatic transfer that averages 3% of quarterly GDP repeated four 
times (quarterly) reduces the unemployment rate an additional full percentage point and thereby completes 
the recovery.   We recommend that legislatures enact an automatic counter-cyclical fiscal policy that will 
assure adequate stimulus without generating a long-term debt problem.    
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1.  Introduction 
 
In this paper we analyze the use of an automatic counter-cyclical fiscal policy to help combat a 
severe recession when the central bank is constrained by the zero interest-rate bound.  We provide a 
quantitative estimate of the cash transfer or tax cut that would achieve full recovery.  Our estimate is 
obtained by adapting and simulating a macro-econometric model that has been recently econometrically 
estimated and has a short-run marginal propensity to consume out of transfers or tax cuts that is consistent 
with several recent empirical studies.  We inject a substantial negative demand shock that generates a 
severe recession and find that the zero bound prevents even an aggressive monetary expansion from 
achieving a full recovery.  However, when monetary expansion is assisted by a counter-cyclical transfer 
(or tax cut), full recovery is achieved.  With the interest rate near zero, a cash transfer equal to 3% of 
quarterly GDP repeated four times (quarterly), or an equal tax cut sustained for four quarters, would 
reduce the unemployment rate nearly a full percentage point.  We show how the appropriate transfer (or 
tax cut) can be triggered by a counter-cyclical fiscal policy rule so that the fiscal stimulus is automatically 
started with recession and terminated with recovery so that it does not lead to an undesirable 
accumulation of debt by the government.  In the next section we examine the policy implications of our 
simulations.  Subsequent sections describe and report on the simulations.      
 
2.  Policy Framework and Recommendation 
 
The zero interest-rate bound has become a more serious and relevant obstacle to combating  
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recessions as central banks have become more effective at keeping inflation low.
1  Economic theory and 
empirical evidence suggest that low inflation economies will generally have low nominal interest rates.  But 
this means that if the economy is hit with a significant negative demand shock, the central bank has fewer 
percentage points to work with to counter the recession.   
When Japan was hit with a negative demand shock in the 1990s, the Bank of Japan cut short-
term interest rates a few points and promptly bumped into the zero bound; thereafter the Japanese 
economy continued to stagnate with insufficient demand for a nearly decade.  As Bernanke (2000) 
argued, the Bank of Japan needed help from expansionary fiscal policy to overcome the zero bound and 
sufficiently stimulate the economy.  In its recession of 2001 the U.S. had a close call.  Under Greenspan 
the Federal Reserve dropped the federal funds rate from 6.5% to 1.0%.  Fortunately, the U.S. economy 
strengthened just in time because of fiscal stimulus from tax cuts and rebates.  The Fed just barely avoided 
bumping into the zero bound.  It is especially significant that U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke, in 
two speeches (2002, 2003) as a member of the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve 
System, made the case for using tax cuts or transfers to overcome the zero bound in a severe recession. 
Two recent empirical studies of the 2001 U.S. recession published in the American Economic 
Review (Johnson, Parker, and Souleles, 2006; Shapiro and Slemrod, 2003a) imply that an old-fashioned 
Keynesian fiscal stimulus—a cash transfer (“tax rebate”) or tax cut to households-- can overcome the 
zero interest-rate bound.  The econometric model we use has a short-run marginal propensity to consume 
(MPC) that is roughly the same as Shapiro and Slemrod and roughly half of Johnson, Parker, and 
                                                 
1  A useful introduction to the zero bound problem is the symposium of articles published in the Journal of 
Money, Credit, and Banking, November 2000 Part 2.  
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Souleles.   
Most of the zero interest-rate bound papers have ignored Keynesian fiscal stimulus  (exceptions 
are Posen 1998, Bernanke 2000, Kuttner and Posen 2001, and Seidman 2001), preferring to examine 
whether monetary policy alone can revive the economy despite the zero bound (Eggertsson 2006; 
Auerbach and Obstfeld 2005, 2004; Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack 2004; Bernanke and Reinhart 2004; 
Eggertsson and Woodford 2004, 2003; Coenen and Wieland 2004; Clouse, Henderson, Orphanides, 
Small, and Tinsley 2003; Svensson 2003, 2002; Fuhrer and Sniderman 2000; Reifschneider and Williams 
2000; McCallum 2000; and Krugman 1998).
2  Moreover, these articles do not incorporate the results of 
the two recent empirical studies of the impact of the tax rebate in the 2001 recession.  Finally, most of the 
recent zero bound papers do not use an econometrically estimated model (an exception is Reifschneider 
and Williams 2000, but their paper largely omits fiscal stimulus).  By contrast, we obtain our quantitative 
estimates by adapting and simulating a macro-econometric model that has been recently econometrically 
estimated, updated, and statistically tested using U.S. time-series data (the historical context of the macro-
econometric model is delineated in Valadkhani 2004).  A recent exposition and application of this macro-
econometric model is given by Fair (2005a).     
  We analyze the use of a new counter-cyclical fiscal policy that automatically triggers stimulus in a 
severe recession and terminates stimulus upon recovery in order to avoid an undesirable long-term 
accumulation of debt by the government.  There are two advantages of making the policy automatic.  
First, it is risky to rely on legislatures to take prompt discretionary action.  Second, an automatic counter-
                                                 
2  Feldstein (2002) proposes a new and different kind of fiscal stimulus—a temporary cut in a 
consumption tax rate—which would provide a price incentive to spend promptly.  Though he regards his  
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cyclical policy anchors the expectations of economic agents in a way that leads to stabilizing behavior; if 
consumers and business managers know that fiscal stimulus will be automatically triggered in a recession, 
they will maintain their spending, confident that the recession will prove short-lived.  The mechanism for 
triggering and detriggering the fiscal stimulus is based on real-time signals that would actually be available 
(the importance of real-time determinants of fiscal policy is emphasized in Golinelli and Momigliano 2006). 
 If such an automatic counter-cyclical stimulus were enacted, it would make one component of fiscal 
policy endogenous (Perez and Hiebert 2004 analyze endogenous fiscal policy in macroeconomic models). 
 This automatic counter-cyclical policy is fully consistent with fiscal policy rules that others have proposed 
and analyzed to prevent excessive long-term debt accumulation or excessive long-term deadweight loss 
(Bruck and Zwiener 2006, Tanner 2004, Johnson 2003) because the counter-cyclical transfer is 
automatically set to zero as long as the economy is not in recession.  
  Because central banks are likely to keep inflation, inflationary expectations, and nominal interest 
rates low, we recommend that legislatures enact an automatic counter-cyclical fiscal policy that will assure 
adequate stimulus in any severe recession despite the zero bound constraint on  central banks.  We judge 
this to be a prudent addition to the current arsenal of automatic stabilizers.      
 
3.  The Macroeconometric Model 
 
We use the US quarterly macro-econometric model developed by Ray Fair of Yale University, 
which we modify to address the specific zero bound problem.  The Fair model has been recently 
                                                                                                                                                                
proposal as a substitute for cash transfers, it can also be viewed as a complement (Seidman 2003).    
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econometrically estimated, updated, and tested using U.S. times series data (Fair 2004).  Two recent 
articles have reported studies that use the Fair model to provide estimates of the effectiveness of monetary 
policy (Fair 2005a) and the impact of monetary and fiscal policy on the 2001 recession (Fair 2005b).  
Fair (1994, 2004) empirically tests for rational expectations with negative results and therefore omits it 
from his model; he comments that if expectations are not rational, then the Lucas critique is not likely to be 
important.  Fair makes his model accessible to other researchers.  We respecify parts of the Fair model, 
and then estimate and simulate the modified Fair model using the Fair-Parke program (Fair 1996) 
downloaded from Fair=s website (http://fairmodel.econ. yale.edu).  Detailed information on the Fair 
model is given by Fair (1994, 2003, 2004).  The impact on the economy of transfers to households 
depends on the marginal propensity to consume (MPC); we note that the Fair model embodies the 
following estimates for the MPC out of disposable income: one-quarter MPC = .20, two-quarter MPC = 
.36, three-quarter MPC = .47, and four-quarter MPC = .55.  How does this compare with the results of 
two recent empirical studies of the impact of the 2001 tax rebate?   
 
4.  Two Recent Empirical Studies on the Cash Transfer (Tax Rebate) in the 2001 Recession 
 
  Two empirical studies of the cash transfer (tax rebate) in the 2001 recession—one by Shapiro 
and Slemrod (2003a, 2003b), the other by Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006)— provide estimates of 
the impact of the transfer on consumer spending.  We briefly review each in turn.  A fuller discussion is 
given in Seidman and Lewis (2006). 
  Through a module in the University of Michigan Survey Research Center’s monthly Survey of  
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Consumers, in March 2002 (roughly two and a half quarters after households received their $600 tax 
rebate) Shapiro and Slemrod asked a sample of consumers what they did with the $600 rebate they 
received from the U.S. Treasury in the summer of 2001.
3  Based on their survey results, they estimated 
(2003b) that the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) the rebate (over the two and a half quarters) 
was between 0.34 and 0.37.  Recall that at the end of the last section we reported that the Fair model has 
a two-quarter MPC of 0.36 and a three-quarter MPC of 0.47.  Thus, the MPC in the Fair model is 
roughly comparable to the MPC estimated by Shapiro and Slemrod.           
  Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006) estimate an impact much larger than Shapiro and Slemrod 
or the Fair model.  They write: 
  “Under the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, most U.S. taxpayers 
received a tax rebate between July and September 2001.  The week in which the rebate was mailed was 
based on the second-to-last digit of the taxpayer’s Social Security number, a digit that is effectively 
randomly assigned.  Using special questions about the rebates added to the Consumer Expenditure 
Survey, we exploit this historically unique experiment to measure the change in consumption expenditures 
caused by receipt of the rebate…”  
 
  Each week from July through September a fraction of households received the rebate.  The order 
in which they received it was random because the timing of the mailing of each rebate was based on the 
second-to-last digit of the recipient’s Social Security number.  The authors emphasize that this random 
assignment was critical to their study.  Also critical to their study was the insertion of a special module with 
questions about the timing and amount of their tax rebate in the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer 
Expenditure Survey.  The authors worked with the staff of the BLS to construct the module.  The authors 
were able to estimate how a household’s spending was affected by the actual receipt of the rebate, 
                                                 
3 Congress enacted the $600 rebate in May (the President signed the law in June) to counter the recession  
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because households received the same rebate check in different weeks that were randomly assigned.  The 
authors report:  
  “We find that households spent about 20-40 percent of their rebates on non-durable goods 
during the three-month period in which their rebates were received, and roughly another third of their 
rebates during the subsequent three month period.  The implied effects on aggregate consumption demand 
are significant.  The estimated responses are largest for households with relatively low liquid wealth and 
low income, consistent with liquidity constraint.” 
 
  Low-income households spent a much larger fraction of their rebate—about 75 percent--  during 
the three month period of receipt than middle-income households.  Also, households with few liquid assets 
spent a significantly greater share of their rebates.   
  Over the two quarters following receipt of the rebate, households spent about two-thirds of their 
rebate on nondurable consumption goods.  Thus, their study implies a magnitude of spending that is 
roughly twice as great as Shapiro/Slemrod or the Fair model.   
  To summarize: Based on these two empirical studies, our use of the Fair model probably 
understates the impact of rebates because the model has a short-run MPC that is roughly the lower 
estimate of these two studies.  
 
5.  The Recession 
 
The baseline Fair forecast for the unemployment rate for eight quarters (2003.3 through 2005.2) 
is shown in the UB column of Table 1.  We introduce a negative demand shock beginning in 2003.3 that 
generates a recession.  If monetary policy were adjusted to keep the Treasury three- 
                                                                                                                                                                
as part of a larger tax package.  
  10 
month bill rate
4 on its baseline path (projected by Fair=s forecast), then the path the unemployment rate 
would follow is shown in the UR column.  For example, in the eighth quarter of recession the  
unemployment rate would be 7.9% (versus 5.5% on the Fair baseline path).
5  We will refer  
to the UR column as Athe recession@ path of the unemployment rate.   
 
6.  Aggressive Monetary Policy  
 
We assume the Fed conducts an aggressive monetary policy: it expands its open-market  
purchases enough to reduce immediately the three-month Treasury bill rate to zero and also collapse the 
term structure, eventually reducing the corporate bond rate and the mortgage rate to near zero.  This is 
more aggressive than the estimated Taylor rule in the Fair model, so to implement the simulation, we 
suspend the estimated Taylor rule in the Fair model and replace it with the aggressive monetary policy 
(details of how we re-specified the model are given in the Appendix).  Under the collapse of the term 
structure, both the bond rate and the mortgage rate are reduced to about 2.2% in the fourth quarter and 
0.9% in the eighth quarter.
6  The UM column of Table 1 shows the path of the unemployment rate under 
                                                 
4 The Treasury bill rate RS is the monthly auction average for the quarter. 
5 This simulation uses the Aaddfact@ and the Aexogenous variable=RS@ commands in Fair-Parke.  We 
adjust (generally downward) the individual constant terms for eight quarters (2003.3-2005.2) in each of 
five equations: the equations for consumer expenditure for services, nondurables, and durables, as well 
as the equations for residential housing investment and business capital stock (which thereby reduces 
non-residential fixed investment). 
6 The bond rate RB is the Aaa corporate bond rate, and mortgage rate RM is the FHA secondary 
market mortgage rate.  Both are quarterly averages of monthly data.  
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this monetary policy.  For example, the eighth quarter unemployment rate would be 6.7% (versus 7.9% 
without aggressive monetary policy).   
 
7.  Counter-Cyclical Fiscal Policy: Cash Transfers to Households 
 
In this paper the fiscal stimulus is cash transfers to households, but the results would be similar if 
the fiscal stimulus were income tax cuts to households.  While transfers can be implemented by 
discretionary action by Congress, we will assume in this paper that Congress pre-enacts a transfer rule 
(automatic transfer rules are discussed in Seidman 2001, Seidman and Lewis 2002, and Seidman 2003) 
that prescribes an automatic triggering of a new cash transfer to households in response to a high 
unemployment rate-- in particular, the rule prescribes a Atransfer/GDP ratio@ that is proportional to the 
Aunemployment gap.@  Congress would specify the aggregate transfer and also how the aggregate 
transfer is distributed to individual households (for example, an equal dollar amount per household).  
Specifically, the aggregate new anti-recession quarterly real transfer R would be given by 
 
R/Y-1  = s[U-1 - (U
N +T)],    R > 0,  
 
where R/Y-1 is the Atransfer ratio@ and [U-1 - (U
N +T)] is the Aunemployment gap@; U-1 is last quarter=s 
unemployment rate, U
N is the NAIRU (the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment), T is a 
threshold above the NAIRU, s is the strength parameter, R is the aggregate quarterly real transfer, and Y-1 
is the quarterly real GDP of the last quarter.  Hence, the transfer rule prescribes a transfer/GDP ratio that  
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is proportional to the unemployment gap.  The Congressional Budget Office would provide an estimate of 
the NAIRU.  Based on the advice of technical staff, Congress would pre-enact the values of T and s.  In 
this paper for illustration , we will use T=0.5%, s=2, and NAIRU=5.2% (based on CBO=s recent 
estimate).  Hence, in our simulations, a transfer is  triggered whenever the unemployment rate exceeds 
5.7%.  For example, in the first quarter of the recession in Table 1 the unemployment rate is 6.7%, so 
applying the formula above, R/Y-1  = 2[6.7% - (5.2%+0.5%)] = 2%.  Thus, the aggregate transfer that 
would be triggered this quarter would equal 2% of last quarter=s GDP-- we will say that the prescribed 
transfer/GDP ratio is 2%.  The unemployment gap in this example is 1.0%.  With s=2, the transfer ratio 
would be twice the unemployment gap.  
It is administratively feasible to trigger a transfer this quarter based on the unemployment rate (U-1) 
and GDP (Y-1) for the preceding quarter.  The Bureau of Labor Statistics announces its estimate of last 
month=s unemployment rate on the first Friday of this month.  The Department of Commerce issues a 
preliminary estimate for the preceding quarter=s GDP one month after the end of the quarter.  To mail the 
checks out in the second and third month, the  Treasury can have the addresses ready to go in advance 
and can enter the dollar amount per check as soon as the Commerce Department=s GDP estimate is 
available.
7  The actual experience with the 2001 $600 tax rebateC enacted in June, and mailed out in July, 
August, and September-- shows that implementing the transfer policy with a one-quarter lag is feasible.  
Similar speed of implementation was achieved in the summer of 2003 with an advanced payment of the 
                                                 
7 Just as it did for the 1975 and 2001 rebates, Congress would indicate how the aggregate amount 
converts into specific dollar amounts on individual checks.  In 2001, each two-adult households 
received $600, whereas in 1975 the dollar amount varied between $0 and $200 based on income.  
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child tax credit. 
We introduce into the Fair model a new endogenous transfer from the federal government to 
households through the transfer rule.
8  The new endogenous transfer is included in the Fair model as 
follows.  The real transfer is Rt (and real GDP in the preceding quarter is Yt-1).  The total nominal transfer 
from federal government to households is TRGHt = TRGHbt + (PHt )Rt, where TRGHbt is Fair=s nominal 
exogenous transfer and (PHt)Rt   is the nominal anti-recession transfer (PHt is a consumer price deflator).  
Implementing the transfer rule involves solving the Fair model successively with the Fair-Parke program.
9  
The UM&F column of Table 1 shows the path of the unemployment rate under the transfer rule 
combined with a monetary policy that achieves the same interest rate path as would have been achieved 
with the aggressive monetary policy described above.  The transfer rule substantially improves the 
performance of the economy.  It reduces the unemployment rate of the economy by nearly a full 
percentage point: the unemployment rate in the eighth quarter is 5.9% versus 6.7% with monetary policy 
only; the improvement in the unemployment rate is shown in the ?U F column (for example, -0.8% in the 
eighth quarter).       
Table 2 shows the magnitude of the transfers and the resulting government deficit and 
debt over the eight quarters.  The Atransfer ratio@ R/Y is the ratio of the new anti-recession quarterly 
                                                 
8Another endogenous transfer which is already included in the Fair model is nominal state and local 
unemployment insurance benefits. 
9 Initially, the variable TRGH is treated endogenously (utilizing the GENR command); the TRGH path 
and the U gap path are solved simultaneously.  In successive rounds the TRGH path is treated as 
exogenous from the previous round and the model is solved for the endogenous U gap path.  The 
transfer rule is then used to solve for the implied TRGH path.  Iteration continues until the TRGH path is 
roughly the same in consecutive rounds.  
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real transfer to quarterly real GDP.  The R/Y column shows the path of the transfer ratio under the 
transfer rule combined with the monetary policy that achieves the same interest rate path 
 (as would have been achieved with the aggressive monetary policy described above): the quarterly 
transfer as a percent of that quarter=s GDP begins at 1.9% in the second quarter,
10 peaks at 2.7% in the 
third quarter, declines to 1.5% in the sixth quarter, and to 0.4% in the eighth quarter; the sum  
of the percentages in the R/Y column--Athe cumulative transfer percentage@C is roughly 12% of a 
quarter=s GDP.  This is the fiscal stimulus required to reduce the unemployment rate by nearly a full 
percentage point (from 6.7% to 5.9%).  
The Adeficit ratio@ (D/Y) in Table 2 is the ratio of the government deficit to GDP.
11  The 
[D/Y]M column shows the path of the deficit ratio under the aggressive monetary policy, and the [D/Y]M&F 
column shows the path under the transfer rule combined with the monetary policy that  
achieves the same interest rate path (as would have been achieved with the aggressive monetary policy).  
The [?D/Y]F column shows the difference between the two paths: [?D/Y]F  rises to a peak of 2.7% in 
the third quarter, declines to 1.1% in the sixth quarter, and to 0.2% in the eighth quarter.  Note that after 
the third quarter, [?D/Y]F is less than R/Y because the fiscal stimulus has strengthened the economy and 
generated endogenous tax revenue that reduces the deficit.  
The  Adebt ratio@ (B/Y) in Table 2 is  the ratio of government debt held by the public (excluding 
                                                 
10 The transfer is 1.9% of this quarter=s GDP and 2% of last quarter=s GDP (as prescribed by the 
transfer rule formula with U-1 =6.7%). 
11 The deficit ratio is the ratio of the NIPA nominal federal deficit deflated by the GDP deflator, to real 
GDP.  
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the central bank) to GDP.
12  The [B/Y]M column shows the path of the debt ratio under the aggressive 
monetary policy, and the [B/Y]M&F column shows the path under the transfer rule combined with the 
monetary policy that achieves the same interest rate path (as would have been achieved with the 
aggressive monetary policy).  The [?B/Y]F column shows the difference between the two paths: [?B/Y]F 
 rises gradually to 2.1% in the eighth quarter.  Note that the aggressive monetary policy mitigates the 
increase in B/YC the ratio of government debt held by the public (excluding the central bank)-- 
because the Fed absorbs some of the government securities sold by the Treasury to finance the deficits.  
 
8.  Conclusions 
 
We provide a quantitative estimate of the cash transfer or tax cut that would achieve recovery 
from a severe recession when the central bank is constrained by the zero interest rate bound.  We adapt 
and simulate a macro-econometric model that has been recently econometrically estimated and has a 
marginal propensity to consume that is roughly consistent with two recent empirical studies of cash 
transfers in the 2001 U.S. recession published in the American Economic Review.  We provide a 
quantitative estimate of the cash transfer that would achieve recovery from a severe recession when 
confronted with the zero bound.   
In the simulation, even an aggressive monetary policy is unable to achieve full recovery because of 
the zero bound.  We introduce an automatic transfer and simulate its triggering in the severe recession.  
                                                 
12 The debt ratio is the ratio of the value of government securities outstanding (outside the federal 
government including the Fed) deflated by the GDP deflator, to annual real GDP.  
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We find that an automatic transfer that averages 3% of quarterly GDP repeated four times (quarterly) 
reduces the unemployment rate an additional full percentage point and thereby completes the recovery.    
We recommend that legislatures enact an automatic counter-cyclical fiscal policy that will assure 
adequate stimulus in any severe recession despite the zero bound constraint on central banks and without 
generating a long-term debt problem.  We judge this to be a prudent addition to the current arsenal of 
automatic stabilizers.  
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Appendix 
 
1. The Fair model uses a historically-estimated interest rate rule for RS (stochastic equation 30).  We 
suppress equation 30 and set exogenous RS equal to (essentially) zero.
13 
2. We set the path for BR exogenously.  BR rises and falls smoothly from $80 billion to $152 billion in the 
fifth quarter to $104 billion in the eighth quarter.  
3. In the Fair model, BR is determined from MB by identity, equation 57.  Since BR is now exogenous, 
we invert identity 57 to solve for MB. 
4. In the Fair model, MB is determined from MH, MF, and CUR by identity, equation 71.  Since MB is 
now determined by identity 57, we invert identity 71 to solve for MH (given values for MF and CUR, 
determined as explained below).  The Fair model uses stochastic equation 9 for MH.  Since MH is now 
determined by identity 71, it is necessary to suppress equation 9. 
5. In the Fair model, MF is determined by stochastic equation 17.  We suppress equation 17.  We solve 
for MF as follows: MF = 0.84[-MB].  The coefficient 0.84 is the approximate average value of MF/[-
MB] under the interest rate rule.  
                                                 
13 The discussion in Fair=s (2003) Table A.8: Solutions under Alternative Monetary Policy 
Assumptions, is a useful guide for the modifications to the Fair model that are made for this simulation 
(in particular, the column for UBR exogenous).  Because the path of the exogenous bank reserves push 
the equilibrium Treasury bill rate below zero, however, it is necessary to modify the material in Table 
A.8.  
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6. In the Fair model, CUR is determined by stochastic equation 26.  We suppress equation 26.  We solve 
for CUR as follows: CUR = 0.80[-MB].  The coefficient 0.80 is the approximate average value of 
CUR/[-MB] under the interest rate rule.  
7. In the Fair model, RB is determined by stochastic equation 23.  We suppress equation 23.  We solve 
for RB as follows: RB = 0.8RB[-1]. 
8. In the Fair model, RM is determined by stochastic equation 24.  We suppress equation 24.  We solve 
for RM as follows: RM = 0.8RM[-1].  
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Table 1: Simulation Results for the Unemployment Rate (U) for the First Eight Quarters 
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Table 2: Simulation Results for the First Eight Quarters 


























































































































































   